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Abstract
One central result in the strategic trade literature is that govern-
ments should not support domestic ”losers” but domestic ”winners”.
We show that when first-mover advantages are taken into account, the
reverse holds, governments have stronger incentives to support domes-
tic ”losers” that face foreign ”winners”. Accordingly, governments can
play Stackelberg against foreign Stackelberg leaders to prevent them
from playing Stackelberg against domestic Stackelberg followers.
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1 Introduction
One central result in the strategic trade literature (Brander and Spencer,
1985) is that it is preferable to subsidize domestic “winners” that face foreign
“losers”, than domestic “losers” that face foreign “winners” (see de Meza,
1986 and Neary, 1994). By “winners” is usually meant the firm that has
higher output production in a given industry. In order to generate this type
of asymmetry in output production, the standard assumption in the literature
has been to make firms diﬀer in marginal costs (de Meza, 1986 and Neary,
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1994). The outcome of this set-up is obviously to have the lower marginal
cost firm produce more than the higher marginal cost firm.
In this context both de Meza (1986) and Neary (1994) show that “win-
ners” should be preferred for government support given that “winners” cause
higher international “profit-shifting” eﬀects from foreign firms to domestic
ones.
Contrary to de Meza (1986) and Neary (1994), who model asymmetries
between firms only along one dimension (i.e.: marginal costs), in this paper
we model “winners” and “losers” along two dimensions. The first is, like in de
Meza (1986) and in Neary (1994), asymmetries in competitiveness that run
through marginal costs of production. The second is asymmetries in first-
mover advantages in the spirit of Stackelberg (1934). It is well known that
a Stackelberg leader in outputs ends up producing more than a Stackelberg
follower, i.e.: a Stackelberg leader is a “winner” and a Stackelberg follower
is a “loser”.
In this framework we show that first-mover advantages are suﬃcient to re-
verse the conclusions of de Meza (1986) and Neary (1994). Accordingly, when
first-mover advantages are taken into account, governments have stronger in-
centives to support domestic “losers” that face foreign “winners”.
The reason for this result is very simple. A Stackelberg leader can pro-
mote “profit-shifting” eﬀects alone and therefore does not need government
support. On the contrary, the Stackelberg follower government has incen-
tives to play Stackelberg against the foreign Stackelberg leader so that the
Stackelberg leader cannot play Stackelberg against the domestic Stackelberg
follower.
2 Asymmetric Stackelberg Leader Model
The world economy consists of two producer countries, the home and the
foreign country, and two firms that produce a homogeneous product, the
home and the foreign firm. Foreign variables are indicated by an asterisk.
It is assumed that firms sell their output only in a third market that is not
involved in production.
As in Brander and Spencer (1985), we allow for national governments
to subsidize exports. Where s is the export subsidy given by the home
government to the home firm and s∗ is the export subsidy given by the
foreign government to the foreign firm.
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We further assume that the foreign firm is the “winner” in the industry
in question. Following the literature in the strategic trade policy (de Meza,
1986 and Neary, 1994) a “winner” is considered to be the firm that produces
more in a given sector. As is also the case in de Meza (1986) and in Neary
(1994), to generate “winners” and “losers” we need to model some kind of
asymmetry between the home and the foreign firm.
In this paper we consider two types of asymmetries. The first is, like in de
Meza (1986) and in Neary (1994), asymmetries in marginal costs; the second
is asymmetries in the order of movements of players. Note that even alone,
these two types of asymmetries can make one firm a “winner” and the other
a “loser”.
We model asymmetries in the order of movements of players by adopting
a standard Stackelberg duopoly model. We consider the foreign firm to be
the Stackelberg leader and the home firm to be the Stackelberg follower. This
means that the foreign firm has a first-mover advantage in outputs relatively
to the home firm. Furthermore, and as is known from these models, the first-
mover advantage of the foreign firm will allow it to produce more than the
home firm, i.e.: without government intervention the foreign firm is going to
be the “winner” and the home firm is going to be the “loser”.
In turn, following de Meza (1986) and Neary (1994), we model asymme-
tries in marginal costs by simply assuming that the foreign firm can have an
advantage in marginal costs relatively to the home firm, i.e.: c ≥ c∗. This
means that if c > c∗, the foreign firm is more competitive than the home
firm, i.e.: without government intervention the foreign firm is going to be
the “winner” and the home firm is going to be the “loser”. Obviously, if
c = c∗, the foreign firm has the same competitiveness level as the home firm.
2.1 Demand and Firms
Following Brander and Spencer (1981), the home and the foreign firm face
linear demands in the third country:
P = a− b (q + q∗) (1)
Where q is sales by the home firm (and similarly q∗ is sales by the foreign
firm), a is the intercept of the demand function and b is an inverse measure
of market size.
Profits by the home and the foreign firm are respectively:
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Π = (P − c− t) q − f + sq
Π∗ = (P − c∗ − t) q∗ − f + s∗q∗ (2)
Where t is the trade cost of transporting goods to the third country, and
f is the fixed cost of production.
Using the home firm FOC, we can first derive the home firm reaction
function:
q(q∗, s) = D+s−bq
∗
2b
(3)
Where D = a− c− t > 0 represents the home firm cost competitiveness
and D∗ = a − c∗ − t > 0 represents the foreign firm cost competitiveness.
Since c ≥ c∗, we then have that D ≤ D∗, i.e.: the foreign firm is more
competitive than the home firm if D < D∗.
2.2 Timing of the Game
The timing of the game is the following: in stage 1 the home country picks
s and the foreign country picks s∗; in stage 2 the foreign firm chooses q∗; in
stage 3 the home firm chooses q.
We abstract from the entry decision of the home firm and therefore we
assume that the fixed costs of production incurred by both the home and the
foreign firm are suﬃciently small so that they do not promote exit.
2.3 Production Equilibrium
Output production by the foreign firm can be found by substituting equation
3 in equation 2 and solving for the foreign firm first order condition (FOC).
After some simple algebra we arrive at the following expression:
q∗ = 2D
∗−D+2s∗−s
2b
(4)
We can also compute output production by the home firm by substituting
the previous expression into equation 3:
q = 3D−2D
∗+3s−2s∗
4b
(5)
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Since we are considering international competition, we want to focus our
analysis on the situations where both the home and the foreign firm can
export even without a subsidy1. Making s = s∗ = 0 in equations 4 and 5,
we can see that international trade is always possible for both the home and
the foreign firm as long as:
D > 2
3
D∗ (6)
In other words, in order to have international competition the cost com-
petitiveness diﬀerence between the home firm and the foreign firm cannot be
extremely large.
It can be easily seen that if export subsidies are not considered (i.e.:
s = s∗), then the foreign firm will always be the “winner” independently of
whether it has only first-mover advantages (i.e.: D = D∗) or competitiveness
advantages as well (i.e.: D < D∗).
In addition, the export subsidy is a “beggar thy neighbor” policy, given
that it results in “profit-shifting” eﬀects. This can be seen by looking at the
home firm reaction function (equation 3), and the output expressions for the
home and the foreign firm (equations 4 and 5). In fact, an export subsidy
by the home government induces the home firm to produce more and the
foreign firm to produce less.
3 Export Subsidy
We now pass on to the export subsidy stage. Note first that the foreign
country welfare function equals:
W ∗ = Π∗ [q (s, s∗) ; q∗ (s, s∗) , s∗]− s∗q∗ (s, s∗) (7)
We can diﬀerentiate the previous expression in relation to s∗ to obtain:
dW∗
ds∗ =
∂Π∗
∂q∗
dq∗
ds∗ +
∂Π∗
∂q
dq
ds∗ − s
∗ dq∗
ds∗ (8)
From the envelope theorem, we have that the first term on the right hand
side of the previous equation equals zero (i.e.: ∂Π
∗
∂q∗ = 0). The second term
also cancels out since the home firm being a follower cannot influence the
strategic choices of the foreign firm (i.e.: ∂Π
∗
∂q = 0). Finally, for the last term
1This is a standard assumption in the trade literature.
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we have that −s∗ dq∗
ds∗ = −s∗
1
b
. Therefore the optimal subsidy for the leader
foreign firm is zero2:
sˆ∗ = 0 (9)
In this sense an export subsidy to the Stackelberg leader (the foreign
firm) reduces the foreign country welfare. The foreign firm does not need an
export subsidy, since it has already a first mover advantage. Accordingly, a
subsidy to the Stackelberg leader increases the tax burden of the society but
does not generate any compensation welfare gains. This is so because output
decisions made by the foreign firm already take into account the eﬀects on
the strategic choices of the home firm. In other words, the foreign firm can
do “profit-shifting” eﬀects by itself without the need of a subsidy.
To derive the home government subsidy, we start by defining the home
country welfare function:
W = Π [q (s, s∗) ; q∗ (s, s∗) , s]− sq (s, s∗) (10)
Diﬀerentiating the above expression in relation to s we obtain:
dW
ds
= ∂Π∂q
dq
ds
+ ∂Π∂q∗
dq∗
ds
− sdq
ds
(11)
From the envelope theorem we have that, the first term on the right hand
side of the previous equation equals zero (i.e.: ∂Π∂q = 0). For the second and
third terms we have respectively ∂Π∂q∗
dq∗
ds
= 1
2
q and −sdq
ds
= −s 3
4b
. It follows
that the above equation can be simplified to:
dW
ds
= 1
2
q − 3s
4b
(12)
Solving the previous equation for s and substituting for q from equation
5 we obtain the optimal subsidy for the home firm:
sˆ = 3D−2D
∗
3
(13)
Note, first, that the amount of subsidy given by the home government
is decreasing in the competitiveness disadvantage of the home firm, i.e.: the
home firm subsidy is higher when D is closer to D∗.
Second if D = D∗ (only first-mover advantages) then the subsidy to
the home firm is always higher than that to the foreign firm (remember
2The symbol ˆ represents equilibrium subsidy.
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that sˆ∗ = 0). The same occurs for D < D∗ (first-mover advantages plus
asymmetries in competitiveness) if equation 6 holds.
What this means is that, as long as the home firm is able to export, the
export subsidy to the home firm is always higher than that to the foreign
firm:
sˆ > sˆ∗ (14)
In other words, in the context of our model, governments should support
“losers” not “winners”.
We are then interested in knowing why this occurs. Start by noting that
the relation between the home and the foreign firm outputs is:
q = 3D−2D
∗
2b
q∗ = 4D
∗−3D
3b
(15)
Clearly if D = D∗ then the Stackelberg follower (the home firm) produces
more than the Stackelberg leader (the foreign firm). Then, if the foreign firm
has only first-mover advantages, an export subsidy by the home government
makes the home firm the “winner” and the foreign firm the “loser”.
If D < D∗, however, the home government subsidy will only make the
home firm produce more than the foreign firm if D > 14
15
D∗ since q − q∗ =
15D−14D∗
6b
. This means that if the home firm competitiveness disadvantage is
very large (i.e.: 2
3
D∗ < D < 14
15
D∗), the home government subsidy cannot
make the home firm the “winner”. However, if the competitiveness disad-
vantage of the home firm is not very large (14
15
D∗ < D < D∗), the home
government subsidy can make the Stackelberg follower (the home firm) the
“winner” and the Stackelberg leader (the foreign firm) the “loser”.
Summing up, the home country has incentives to support the “loser” do-
mestic firm because by playing Stackelberg against the foreign Stackelberg
leader firm it can preclude the Stackelberg leader from playing Stackelberg
against the domestic Stackelberg follower. In addition, if the competitive-
ness disadvantage of the home firm is not too large, the home government
intervention can make the initial “loser” home firm into a “winner” (and the
reverse for the foreign firm).
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4 Discussion
In this paper we have shown that the existence of first-mover advantages
is suﬃcient to reverse one of the main conclusions from the strategic trade
policy literature that governments shall support “winners” not “losers”.
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